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Abstract. Many excellent architectures exist that allow imitation of
actions involving observable goals. In this paper, we develop a Sim-
ulation Theory-based architecture that uses continuous visual per-
spective taking to maintain a persistent model of the demonstrator’s
knowledge of object locations in dynamic environments; this allows
an observer robot to attribute potential actions in the presence of goal
occlusions, and predict the unfolding of actions through prediction
of visual feedback to the demonstrator. The architecture is tested in
robotic experiments, and results show that the approach also allows
an observer robot to solve Theory-of-Mind tasks from the ‘False Be-
lief’ paradigm.
1 Introduction
When we see another person performing an action, we are usually
able to understand the purpose and intention underlying the action,
and can reproduce the action for ourselves. The HAMMER architec-
ture [5, 16] can be used to equip a robot with this common human
ability. The HAMMER architecture achieves the mapping between ob-
served and self-generated action by directly involving the observer
robot’s motor system in the action recognition process; during obser-
vation of the demonstrator’s actions, all the observer’s inverse models
(akin to motor programs) are executed in parallel in simulation us-
ing forward models. The simulated actions generated by the inverse
models are compared to the observed action, and the one that matches
best is selected as being the observed action. The internal action
simulation, combined with the comparison to the observed action,
achieves the mapping between observed action and self-generated
action that is required for imitation [4].
By using the motor system to achieve action recognition, the HAM-
MER architecture is taking a Simulation Theory approach to solv-
ing the imitation problem. In the ‘Theory of Mind’ paradigm, the
Simulation Theory is used to attribute mental states to other people
by using one’s own cognitive decision-making mechanism as a ma-
nipulable model of other’s minds, taken off-line and placed into the
context of their situation [13, 9, 8]. For this to work, the state of
the ‘target’ agent is used instead of one’s own state, but transformed
into an egocentric format that our first-person decision-making and
behaviour-generation mechanisms will accept.
Similarly, in order to provide meaningful data for comparison, the
simulated actions used by the HAMMER architecture during recog-
nition must be generated as though from the point of view of the
demonstrator. Since the HAMMER architecture uses a Simulation
Theory approach, the observer’s inverse models require first-person
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data in order to generate actions, and so spatial and visual perspective
taking are used to achieve the egocentric ‘shift’ from the observer to
the demonstrator. The data required for the inverse models to operate
is therefore derived from consideration of the demonstrator’s phys-
iospatial and sensory circumstances, and not the observer’s, using
perspective taking [11].
However, it is not only instantaneous sensory information that in-
forms goal selection and action planning. It is through keeping in
memory details of objects that are seen that cognitive maps are built
up, which are critical to action generation. In this paper, we present a
Simulation Theory approach to perspective taking that allows an ob-
server robot to use its visual perceptual mechanisms in simulation to
determine what the demonstrator is seeing; by performing this pro-
cess continually, the observer’s first-person cognitive map generation
routines can be used to build up and maintain a representation of the
demonstrator’s own cognitive map. Taking into account the demon-
strator’s knowledge of the world in this manner allows more accurate
state and goal information to be fed to the HAMMER architecture.
2 Background
In common and also academic use, the term ‘perspective taking’ has
many meanings in many different situations. There are such defini-
tions as:
• “People’s ability to experience and describe the presentation of an
object or display from different vantage points” [1]
• “Imagining oneself in another’s shoes” [7]
• “Understand[ing] how others perceive space and the relative po-
sitions of objects around them- [...] the ability to see things from
another person’s point of view” [15]
• “Consider[ing] the needs and wants of the opponent” [6]
In this paper we focus on equipping robots with perceptual and
cognitive perspective-taking abilities, through a Simulation Theory
approach, in order to improve the quality of the state information fed
to the HAMMER architecture. In this architecture, a cognitive map
is defined as being a representation in memory of the location of ob-
served objects. This memory is updated continually from observation
of the environment, and is available to the action generation system
for action planning. The cognitive map is used also as a manipulable
spatial model of the environment to facilitate perspective taking; to
enable visual perceptual perspective taking, the objects in the cogni-
tive map are linked with visuo-spatial representations that are used
to re-create the visual image seen by the demonstrator.
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2.1 HAMMER
The HAMMER (Hierarchical Attentive Multiple Models for Execu-
tion and Recognition) architecture is a Simulation-Theoretical archi-
ture for action recognition and imitation, based on the hierarchical
coupling of internal models to produce simulation loops. HAMMER
achieves first-person action generation using coupled inverse and for-
ward models, and uses the same arrangement to achieve imitation,
but fed from a perceptual perspective-taking process involving inter-
nal inverse and forward vision models. The perceptual perspective
taking process has been shown to improve the performance of action
recognition in situations where the observer must take into account
visual occlusions and visual cues provided to the target [11].
2.2 Internal Inverse and Forward Models
One of the core components of the HAMMER architecture is the in-
verse model for motor control. Inverse models represent functionally
specialised units for generating actions to achieve certain goals. The
generic inverse model takes as input the current state of a system, a
goal state that is the system’s desired state, and produces as output
the action required to move the system from its current state to the
goal state [12, 18]. In the control theory literature, the inverse model
is known as a controller and its outputs are control signals; when
applied to robotics, the current state is the state of the robot and its
environment, and the outputs are motor commands. In that context,
inverse models are known as behaviours.
Inverse models have several internal states, that are used in action
execution and recognition [10]. One of these states is the applica-
bility of the inverse model. When presented with a goal, the inverse
model will calculate its level of applicability through simulation with
its coupled forward model. The applicability is a measure of how use-
ful the inverse model is for achieving the goal. A low applicability
level means that the inverse model cannot achieve the goal from its
current state, for example, the “Place object on shelf” inverse model
when the shelf is too high to reach. The applicability level is ex-
plained in more detail in Section 3.3.
Forward models of causal dynamics are used in predictive control
systems. The classic forward model takes as input a system state and
the dynamics currently acting on the system, and produces as output
the predicted next state of the system. In the HAMMER architecture,
multiple forward models are coupled to inverse models to create a
simulation process. This approach is similar to that used in other in-
ternal model-based systems for motor control [21, 20]. When cou-
pled to an inverse model, a forward model receives the action output
from the inverse model; the forward model then generates a predic-
tion of the state that would result, if the action was to be performed.
2.3 Inverse and Forward Vision Models
In [11], the capacity for visual perceptual perspective taking was in-
troduced to the HAMMER architecture. In keeping with the simula-
tion theoretical approach, this was achieved through a biologically
inspired simulation of visual perception. In the same way as action
recognition and imitation is achieved in the HAMMER architecture
through coupled inverse and forward models as used in control, vi-
sual perception and perspective taking is performed here through
coupled inverse and forward models of the visual process. The in-
verse vision model is defined as taking two inputs, the first being
a camera image, and the second being the visual parameters with
which to process that image. The output from the model is the state
Figure 1. The perspective-taking process. Image information from the
camera, and the robot’s own knowledge held in the cognitive map, are fed
into a cascade of perspective transform ‘filters’. The outputs at each stage are
used as the ‘pretend states’ fed into the HAMMER architecture. ‘PT’ indicates
a perspective transform stage, and ‘IVM’ indicates an inverse vision model
for performing image processing.
output from processing. A forward vision model is defined as hav-
ing two inputs and one output. The forward vision model takes as
input visual object properties retrieved from the cognitive map (e.g.
colour, shape, etc), and their desired state (e.g. positions and orien-
tations taken from the cognitive map), and produces as output the
visual image that results from reconstructing these inputs. Inverse
and forward vision models are described in detail in [11].
The coupling of inverse and forward vision models results in sim-
ulation of perception, and gives HAMMER the ability to consider
what the demonstrator sees, as well as its position. This enables the
observer robot to take into account visual occlusions effecting the
demonstrator, and through continual usage, the observer can keep
track of what objects the demonstrator has seen in the past and po-
tentially stored in its cognitive map. Because the demonstrator sees
different things to the observer due to its differing viewpoint, it be-
comes necessary for the observer robot to maintain a representation
of the demonstrator’s cognitive map in order to predict and recognise
actions. In keeping with the simulation theory approach, this may be
achieved by recruiting the observer’s own cognitive map creation and
updating processes, but fed with information derived from visual per-
ceptual perspective taking instead of first-person visual information.
Figure 2 shows the perception simulation process.
3 Implementation
The perspective taking architecture shown in Figures 1 and 2 was im-
plemented in C++ for experiments involving an observing observer
robot and a demonstrator robot. The target robots were ActivMedia
Peoplebots, equipped with grippers and firewire cameras. A version
of HAMMER was implemented and linked to the perspective taking
architecture.
3.1 Inverse and Forward Vision Models
Inverse vision models were implemented using the ARToolkit Plus,
an extension of the ARToolkit [2]. When presented with an im-
age containing two-dimensional square markers (fiducials) of known
size, the ARToolkit can calculate the position and orientation of the
markers in world co-ordinates. A set of three objects was therefore
produced with fiducials attached, and in order to extract the demon-
strator robot’s position and orientation at any point in time, a cubic
AR ‘hat’ was made, with a fiducial on each vertical face. This en-
sured that no matter which direction the demonstrator robot was fac-
ing, the observer robot would be able to determine its location and
orientation.
To construct visual scenes from the transformed cognitive map,
the forward vision models used the OpenGL graphics library
(www.opengl.org). To ensure that the same inverse vision models
as used for first-person visual processing would work with the re-
constructed image for the demonstrator robot, the fiducials used by
the ARToolkit were added in as OpenGL textures and linked to the
object entries in the cognitive map.
Figure 2. The perception simulation loop. The observer’s first-person view
of the scene is used to build up the observer’s cognitive map of the scene.
The cognitive map is filtered through the cognitive map perspective
transform that ‘filters’ the observer’s cognitive map to make it like the
demonstrator’s. This is then used as a basis for the perceptual perspective
transform, that begins with a spatial geometric transform to ‘re-centre’ on
the demonstrator, and then fed through the forward vision model to re-create
what the demonstrator is seeing. The observer can then use its inverse vision
models on the image to update its representation of the demonstrator’s
cognitive map, in the same way as it would update its own.
3.2 Cognitive Map Definition
The cognitive map was defined as being a list of objects, held in
memory. It was assumed that the robots already knew what each ob-
ject was and could identify them through the inverse vision models
(i.e. the inverse vision models were programmed to recognise the ob-
jects, through use of the fiducials, and extract relevant information).
When visual information for the objects was available from the in-
verse vision models, the cognitive map entries for those objects were
updated with world position and orientation values. Linked with this
information was a three-dimensional model of each object, and vi-
sual information (e.g. colour and texture) that would be used by the
observer’s forward vision model to re-create the image of the scene
from the point of view of the demonstrator. As can be seen from
Figure 1, the perspective-taking process is then comprised of the fol-
lowing steps:
1. The demonstrator is identified and the correct cognitive map per-
spective transform, comprising the differences from the observer’s
own cognitive map, is applied;
2. A spatial perspective transform is applied to the resulting cogni-
tive map, to re-centre it upon the demonstrator;
3. The forward vision model takes in the re-centred spatial data, and
accesses the visual information linked to the objects in the cogni-
tive map, to re-construct the image that the demonstrator is seeing.
This image is then processed by the observer’s inverse vision mod-
els, to update the demonstrator’s cognitive map transform, and to
provide state information to HAMMER.
3.3 Inverse and Forward Models
Inverse models for the HAMMER architecture were implemented as
PID controllers, generating robot velocities and delta-angle headings
in order to minimise the distance between the robot grippers and a
goal object. The state information required for the inverse models
was taken from either the observer’s own cognitive map, or its repre-
sentation of the demonstrator’s cognitive map. When used for action
simulation, the applicability level At of the inverse model was cal-
culated for the nth simulation iteration according to:
At,n =
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The applicability accumulation is discounted over time and is in-
creased (rewarded) if the inverse model is making progress towards
achieving its goal, and decreased (punished) if it is not. The state dis-
tance between current state St and the goal state vector λ is defined
as:
Sd =
M∑
i=1
|λi − St,i| (2)
When Sd was less than a completion threshold ǫ1, the inverse
model became complete and did not generate motor commands even
when instructed to execute. In the following experiments, ǫ1 was cho-
sen to be 0.04.
Forward models used Euler integration to form 1-timestep predic-
tions based on the current state, and the robot velocity and heading
motor commands generated by the inverse models. As in [11], the
forward models were equipped with collision models of the robot
and objects in the environment, allowing the forward model to pre-
dict position and velocity states in situations when the robot ran into
tables or other objects.
3.4 Perspective Taking Visual Representations —
‘Ghosts’
Through coupling the perception simulation loop to the simulation of
action enabled by the HAMMER architecture, it is possible to predict
the visual feedback arising from the action. By processing this visual
feedback with the inverse vision models, and updating the cognitive
map representation, the action simulation can continue further into
the future, and the outcome of actions predicted. In section 4, exper-
iments are described in which this approach is used to create mul-
tiple Perspective Taking Visual Representations (PTVRs), parallel
instances of the observer’s own perception and action mechanisms,
each driven by a different inverse model. Using perspective taking,
the observer can place these ‘ghosts’ in the place of the demonstrator,
and use them to predict what the visual feedback will be from possi-
ble actions the demonstrator may perform. This allows the observer
to predict the changes to the demonstrator’s knowledge of the world
during the course of a possible action, and how this may effect the
course of the action. Figure 3 shows the arrangement.
Figure 3. Perception and action simulation coupled for the generation of
PTVRs (‘ghosts’). Multiple ghosts can be instantiated and used in parallel,
each one driven by a different inverse model. By coupling the HAMMER
action simulation loop to the perception simulation loop, it is possible to
predict the visual feedback to the ghost and therefore the updates to the
ghost’s cognitive map. A ghost can represent either the observer or the
demonstrator performing a certain action.
4 Experiments
The implemented perspective-taking architecture was deployed onto
the robots arranged in the scenario shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Plan view of the experimental setup. The observer robot faces
two tables. Table 1 has objects 1 and 2, and table 2 has object 3. The
demonstrator robot is positioned so that it, and the tables and the objects, can
be clearly seen by the observer. The demonstrator is placed facing and close
to table 1, so that initially it is able only to see objects 1 and 2. The dashed
lines indicate the fields-of-view of the robots. The plan is not to scale, but
measurements have been provided to indicate size and relative position.
Measurements are in millimetres. The objects were 150mm across their long
edge. The ARToolKit fiducials had 120mm edge, and were mounted as per
Figure 5.
Three ARToolKit fiducials were attached to triangular objects, to
enable both the observer and the demonstrator to identify and lo-
cate those objects. The objects were placed so that both the observer
and the demonstrator could see the objects, however, initially, the
observer could see all three objects whereas the demonstrator could
see only the first two. The objects and the demonstrator robot were
given simple 3D models to enable their reconstruction into the image
produced by the forward vision model. Similarly, the implemented
HAMMER architecture was provided with three ’nudge object’ in-
verse models, one for each of the objects used during the experi-
ments. These inverse models, when activated, produced motor com-
mands for moving the robots from their current position to the spe-
cific object, and stopped when the robot gripper touched the object.
During the experiments it was assumed that the demonstrator’s cam-
era was kept stationary with respect to the robot’s frame, pointing
directly ahead of the robot.
4.1 Experimental Scenarios
The first experiment was designed to test the architecture’s ability to
update its cognitive map representations, in the presence of demon-
strator movements, and object movements both seen and unseen by
the demonstrator. There were three parts:
1. The observer takes the perspective of the demonstrator robot, and
initialises its representation of the demonstrator’s cognitive map;
2. Demonstrator rotates 45 degrees to its right. The observer, through
continual perspective taking, updates its cognitive map represen-
tations;
3. Object 1 is moved, unseen to the demonstrator, but seen by the
observer.
Experiment Two took this further, by having the observer main-
tain its cognitive map representations over five episodes of object
and demonstrator movements, in which objects were occluded from
both the demonstrator and the observer. The observer also had to
use its cognitive map representations to attempt to determine what
actions the demonstrator believed it could perform, through using
perspective taking and action simulation to calculate inverse model
applicabilities. The sequence was the following:
1. Demonstrator can see objects 1 and 2. Object 1 is not graspable,
and the demonstrator cannot see object 3 (Figure 4);
2. Object 1 is moved close to the demonstrator, occluding object 2
from the observer;
3. Demonstrator rotates 45 degrees to its right. Object 3 becomes
observable (as per Figure 7 B);
4. Object 1 is moved back to original position. The observer can see
this, but the demonstrator cannot;
5. Demonstrator rotates back to original position.
In Experiment Three the observer robot had to maintain its cogni-
tive map representations over four episodes of simultaneous demon-
strator and object movements. The observer also had to predict the
visual feedback during each potential demonstrator action using its
PTVRs, in order to predict the impact of false beliefs on the perfor-
mance of the actions. The sequence was the following:
1. Demonstrator can see objects 1 and 2. Object 1 is not graspable,
and the demonstrator cannot see object 3 (Figure 4);
2. Demonstrator rotates 45 degrees to its right, then object 1 is moved
to a graspable position (unseen by demonstrator);
3. Objects 1 and 2 are moved away (unseen by demonstrator);
4. Demonstrator rotates back to original position. Object 3 moved
away (unseen by demonstrator).
5 Results
5.1 Experiment 1
Figure 6 shows the observer’s view of the scene during part 1 of the
experiment. The demonstrator robot and the objects are visible. Fig-
ure 6 A shows the thresholded camera image fed to the observer’s
inverse vision models, and Figure 6 B shows the resulting recon-
struction of the visual scene, using data from the observer’s cognitive
map and its forward vision model. The ARToolKit has successfully
extracted the position and orientation of the objects and the demon-
strator, and Table 1 shows the contents of the observer’s cognitive
map resulting from the processing. The X, Y, Z position and angle
of objects are extracted and updated in the observer’s cognitive map
representations while the objects are visible.
Table 1. Cognitive map entries for centroid positions and orientations of
objects when viewed by the observer robot (first-person perspective). The
values shown are relative to the observer’s camera position and orientation.
The results correspond to the scene shown in Figure 6.
Object X (m) Y (m) Z (m) Angle (Degrees)
Demonstrator -0.56 0.20 1.80 357.51
Object 1 0.32 -0.28 1.61 44.03
Object 2 0.20 -0.27 1.75 50.39
Object 3 -0.15 -0.24 2.21 12.13
Table 1 0.37 0.00 1.75 90.00
Table 2 -0.15 0.00 2.30 0.00
Figure 7 shows the result of the perceptual perspective taking. Fig-
ure 7 A is what the observer determines the demonstrator to be seeing
during the first part of the experiment; Figure 5 shows the demonstra-
tor’s actual camera image of this scene—the simulation of perception
has clearly resulted in accurate perspective taking. Objects 1 and 2
are observed, but object 3 is outside the field-of-view on the table to
the right. Figure 7 B shows the scene during part 2, after the demon-
strator has rotated 45 degrees to the right. The observer robot realises
through perspective taking that object 3 is now visible to the demon-
strator, and objects 1 and 2 are not.
Table 2 shows the results from part 3 — moving object 1 while it
can be seen by the observer, but not by the demonstrator. Through
perceptual perspective taking the observer knows that the demon-
strator cannot see the object being moved — and so, it updates its
own cognitive map with the change in position, but not the demon-
strator’s. This leads to the discrepancy between the object 1 position
values for the observer and the demonstrator, as shown in the table.
The demonstrator believes that the object is in the place where it last
saw it, whereas the observer knows it to be somewhere else.
Table 2. Cognitive map entries for observer and demonstrator after
movement of object 1 inside the observer’s field of view but outside of the
demonstrator’s. Through perceptual perspective taking, the observer knows
that the demonstrator cannot see object 1 while it is being moved, and so the
demonstrator’s cognitive map is not updated with the changes in position
and orientation as the object is moved.
Object X (m) Y (m) Z (m) Angle (Degrees)
Observer’s Cognitive Map
Object 1 0.12 0.06 0.55 20.96
Object 2 0.24 -0.26 1.82 55.07
Object 3 0.05 -0.23 2.17 40.86
Demonstrator’s Cognitive Map
Object 1 0.26 -0.03 0.83 64.40
Object 2 0.24 -0.26 1.82 55.07
Object 3 0.05 -0.23 2.17 40.86
5.2 Experiment 2
Building on the success of Experiment 1, the perspective taking was
linked to the HAMMER architecture for action simulation experi-
ments. Figure 8 shows the results of the applicability calculations for
Figure 5. The demonstrator’s view of the table and objects 1 and 2. Figure
7 (A) shows an internal simulation of this viewpoint by the observer.
Experiment 2. Each episode is separated by a period of zero applica-
bility, before the action simulations begin and then reset five seconds
later. Figure 8 A shows the applicability levels when the observer is
drawing on its representation of the demonstrator’s cognitive map to
generate state information for the inverse models, and in Figure 8 B
the observer is using its own cognitive map. The final applicability
levels achieved by each inverse model are shown in Table 3.
The top graph effectively shows the observer’s attempt to deter-
mine, through simulation, what actions the demonstrator believes it
can perform; the lower graph is the observer calculating what ac-
tions the demonstrator can actually perform, given the state of the
world as the observer knows it to be. In the first three episodes, the
demonstrator’s cognitive map and the observer’s own are in agree-
ment as to what inverse models are applicable: the ‘nudge object 3’
inverse model is not simulated for the demonstrator in the first two
episodes as the observer determines that the demonstrator is unaware
of object 3’s existence (through the perceptual perspective taking).
While the demonstrator is looking at object 3, object 1 is moved to
an un-nudgeable position; the demonstrator does not see this, but the
observer does, the result being that the observer calculates that the
demonstrator still believes that touching object 1 is possible, even
though it itself knows that the action cannot be accomplished. Upon
the demonstrator rotating back to observe objects 1 and 2 in episode
5, the false belief is resolved and the applicability levels are once
again in agreement.
5.3 Experiment 3
Experiment 3 took the perspective taking-action simulation of Exper-
iment 2 further, by having the observer use its PTVRs to predict the
visual feedback resulting from potential demonstrator actions, and
through this, predict the updates to the demonstrator’s cognitive map
and how this would effect the outcome of each action. Figure 9 shows
the results. Figure 9 A shows the applicability levels of the three in-
verse models over the four episodes, as determined by the observer
when observing the demonstrator and basing its action simulations
on its representation of the demonstrator’s cognitive map. Figure 9
B, C and D show the cognitive map updates predicted by each of the
three ‘ghosts’, as used by the observer during prediction of visual
feedback.
In this experiment, the demonstrator robot may not see an object
being moved at the time, but if it believes an action with that object
Figure 6. The observer’s view of the scene. (A) shows the thresholded camera image sent to the inverse vision models. Objects 1 and 2 are on the table facing
the demonstrator, and object 3 is on the table facing the observer. (B) shows the observer’s cognitive map, rendered by OpenGL. The three fiducial markers can
clearly be seen on the tables, and the demonstrator robot (and its ‘hat’) can be seen to the right.
Figure 7. The demonstrator’s view of the scene, re-created by the observer in simulation. (A) shows the what the demonstrator sees at the beginning of the
experiment, objects 1 and 2. In (B), the demonstrator robot has rotated 45 degrees to the right, and the observer determines that it is able to see object 3. The
demonstrator’s actual view of (A) is shown in Figure 5.
is still possible and begins to execute it, then after it has rotated and
seen the new object configuration, its cognitive map will be updated,
the applicability of the action re-calculated, and then it will stop ex-
ecution since it realises the action is now impossible. Episodes 3 and
4 show this; while the demonstrator is looking at object 3, objects 1
and 2 are moved away from the edge of the table. The demonstrator
still believes that the objects are touchable, and so the observer sends
out ‘ghosts’ to simulate how the action may unfold. The spikes in
Figure 9 B and C show the predicted updates to the demonstrator’s
cognitive map when it sees that the objects have moved; as can be
seen from figure Figure 9 A, negative applicabilities are calculated
and the observer predicts the demonstrator will stop executing those
actions. In episode four, the demonstrator rotates to observe the new
configuration of objects 1 and 2, and unseen, object 3 is moved away.
Figure 9 D shows the resulting cognitive map update for that episode.
Again, the result is that the inverse model is no longer applicable and
the action is halted mid-execution.
6 Discussion
In developmental psychology, several experimental tasks have
been devised in order to investigate the development of cognitive
perspective-taking abilities in the paradigm of false belief. One of
the first tasks in this field was devised by the developmental psychol-
ogists Heinz Wimmer and Josef Perner, in response to Daniel Den-
nett’s critique of the experimental protocols used by David Premack
and Guy Woodruff in their seminal article that originated the term
‘Theory of Mind’ [19, 14]. This is the action prediction task (also
known as the “unexpected transfer” task).
The action prediction task tests an observer determining what a
target agent will do when holding a false belief about the world. The
test subject, usually a child, observes a puppet-show involving the
main character, “Maxi”, and his mother. In the show, Maxi watches
his mother place a chocolate bar inside a box. Maxi then leaves the
room and his mother transfers the chocolate from that box into a dif-
ferent one. Maxi then returns, and the subject is asked where he will
look for the chocolate. Further questions include what Maxi would
tell to someone he wants to deceive as to the location of the choco-
late, and someone he would want to tell the truth to. The result of this
task is that four-year-old children give predictions based on correctly
attributing the false belief, whereas younger children do not.
Through the use of the cognitive map perspective taking described
in this paper, the observer would be able to solve this task. By being
able to represent the cognitive map of the demonstrator robot sepa-
rate to its own, the observer robot is intrinsically able to represent the
concept that the demonstrator may possess a false belief about the
Figure 8. Applicability levels of the observer’s inverse models to the demonstrator, over five repeated episodes. Each episode lasted five seconds, after which
the applicability levels were reset to zero. Table 3 shows the final applicability levels for each inverse model at the end of the each episode.
Figure 9. A. Applicability levels of the observer’s inverse models to the demonstrator, over four repeated episodes. B, C, D. Cognitive map updates for each
of the three ‘ghosts’, executing the inverse models ‘nudge object’ 1, 2, and 3 respectively. A spike indicates that the ‘ghost’ has seen something that necessitates
a change to the cognitive map, and an update is made accordingly. The legend for these graphs is the same as for Figure 8.
location of objects in the world, due to objects moving outside the
field-of-view, or object movement being obscured due to occlusions
within the field of view. When asked to make predictions as to what
the demonstrator may do in such situations, the observer robot is then
able to take into account the false belief in the demonstrator’s goal
setting and action planning. This is illustrated through the results to
part 3 of experiment 1, detailed in section 5.1. Through perceptual
perspective taking the observer knows that the demonstrator cannot
see object 1 being moved — and so, it updates its own cognitive map
with the change in position, but not the demonstrator’s.
Knowledge of this kind, as to the presence of false beliefs in ob-
served agents, can be used by an observer to determine what actions
a target agent considers to be available to it, as opposed to what ac-
tions it can in fact perform. This information is useful when priming
a Simulation-Theory based architecture, such as the HAMMER archi-
tecture, with the action simulations it requires for action recognition.
The demonstrator will derive its own action goals from what it be-
lieves to be the state of the world and move accordingly, and without
a representation of the demonstrator’s cognitive map, the observer
will feed its perspective transform with its own world-state beliefs
and potentially end up hypothesizing different goals for its action
generation systems — this results in the comparison between inter-
nally generated action and observed action being meaningless. In
other words, using perceptual perspective taking alone means that
we see the world as we believe it is from the demonstrator’s point
of view, whereas what we need to do, in order to infer intention,
is see the world as the demonstrator believes it is from the demon-
strator’s point of view. To do the former is to risk not recognising
the demonstrator’s movements and their action context at all, or to
mis-recognise the action as being something else, or to be unable
Table 3. Final applicability levels for each inverse model shown in Figure 8. ‘D’ indicates that the observer is using its representation of the demonstrator’s
cognitive map when determining what inverse models are applicable; ‘O’ indicates that the observer is using its own cognitive map to determine the
applicability level of the inverse models. The numbers highlighted in bold type, for ‘Nudge object 1’ in episode 4, indicates the situation where the observer
determines that the demonstrator may possess a false belief as to the actions it can make. The absence applicability levels for ‘Nudge object 3’ in episodes 1
and 2 is due to the demonstrator robot being unaware, at that stage, of the existence of object 3.
Episode 1 Episode 2 Episode 3 Episode 4 Episode 5
I-Model D O D O D O D O D O
Nudge object 1 -8.80 1.07 3.35 3.05 3.65 3.28 3.65 0.26 -5.28 0.98
Nudge object 2 3.59 3.89 3.59 3.93 3.69 3.22 3.69 3.50 3.97 3.90
Nudge object 3 — 2.85 — 2.86 2.83 2.55 2.87 2.65 3.01 3.25
to interpret the demonstrator’s goal, and therefore be unable to imi-
tate or learn. The results for experiments 2 and 3 show how through
coupling the perspective taking architecture developed in this paper
to the action simulation capabilities of HAMMER, the observer can
successfully predict and attribute actions to the demonstrator, while
taking into account prior knowledge and experience, and potential
false beliefs.
In previous research, the HAMMER architecture was used to model
and make predictions regarding the visuomotor ‘mirror’ neurons
found in area F5 of macaque monkey premotor cortex [3]. These
neurons are active both when observing an object-directed action,
and when performing the same action, leading to suggestions that
they underly the imitation capability. Recently, it was found that a
subset of these neurons fire even when the object goal of the action
is hidden from view, so long as the observer has prior knowledge of
the object’s presence [17]. With the addition of the cognitive map
mechanism described in this paper, HAMMER gains this capability,
by keeping a long-term memory of the locations of objects. This can
be seen in the results for episode 2 of Experiment 2, where object 1
occludes object 2 from the observer’s sight, but the action simulation
is still performed. Furthermore, the results of section 5 offer a further
prediction—that when a demonstrator performs an action based on a
known false belief as to the presence of an object, the observer’s mir-
ror neurons will fire. Although there is currently no evidence either
way, this would lend support to the hypothesis that the mirror neu-
rons encode intention and underly action understanding, in addition
to action recognition.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a perspective-taking architecture that
uses simulation of visual perception to build up and maintain repre-
sentations of the cognitive map of a demonstrator. This mechanism,
used to improve the state information provided to the HAMMER im-
itation architecture, was deployed onto robots for perspective-taking
and action-prediction experiments, in which an observer successfully
attributed potential actions and action predictions to a demonstrator
possessing false beliefs regarding the environment. In future work,
the mechanism will extended and investigated in experiments involv-
ing the observer inferring false beliefs from the actions of a demon-
strator.
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